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THE BIVENS CONSTITUTIONAL TORT:
AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE
PERRY M. ROSENt
In the landmark Bivens decision the Supreme Court inferred from
the Constitution the right to seek damages for the infringement of one's
constitutional rights by a federal official. Unlike its corollary cause of
action against state officials under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, this damages rem-
edy has proved elusive if not almost wholly unavailable. In this Article
Mr. Rosen examines the application of Bivens and the reasons why the
doctrine has failed to provide a meaningful remedy to the victims of
constitutional deprivations. He discusses the formidable obstacles a Biv-
ens plaintiff faces and the tendancy of courts to give more weight to
federal officials' need to perform their duties without the threat of liabil-
ity than to the need to vindicate citizens' constitutional rights. The Arti-
cle concludes that until the courts or Congress restores a proper balance
between these interests, the promise of the Bivens decision will continue
to be unfulfilled.
INTRODUCTION
In 1961 the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Rights Stat-
utes,' specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 could be used by an individual to recover
damages from a state official for deprivation of one's constitutional rights.3 The
Court found a damages remedy appropriate since section 1983 was enacted "to
aid in the preservation of human liberty and human rights."'4 With its decision
in Monroe v. Pape,5 the Supreme Court ushered in the era of the "constitutional
tort"-the right to obtain monetary relief for the violation of one's constitu-
tional rights. At the same time, those citizens whose constitutional rights were
violated by an FBI or INS agent had no similar cause of action since the Civil
Rights Statutes have no application to the actions of a federal official.6
t Cutler & Stanfield, Washington, D.C.; Former Trial Attorney for the U.S. Department of
Justice, Civil Division, specializing in Bivens cases; B.A., 1978, State University of New York at
Albany; J.D., 1981, University of Idaho.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1982).
2. Congress originally enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.
3. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961).
4. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1980) (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 636 (1980) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871) (statement of
Rep. Schellabarger))).
5. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
6. See, eg., Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 441 (10th Cir. 1985) (federal officials ordinarily
not subject to suit under § 1983); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 560 (11th Cir. 1984) (§ 1983
actions do not lie against federal law enforcement officials). A federal official can be sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) if he conspires with a state official to violate the equal protection rights of a citizen.
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830 (1983).
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It was not until a decade later that the Supreme Court created a corollary
cause of action for individuals whose constitutional rights are infringed by an
employee of the federal government. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics7 the Supreme Court ruled that a federal official
could be held personally liable for damages resulting from violations of the
plaintiff's fourth amendment rights. The Court found that in the absence of any
statutory provision providing for such right, such as section 1983, an aggrieved
party could bring suit directly under the Constitution.8
The Supreme Court in Bivens 9 felt compelled to fill a void left by Congress
in the Civil Rights Statutes. As the Court later explained, a "damages remedy
against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating
cherished constitutional guarantees." 10 The Court found it inherently unfair
that an individual whose constitutional rights were violated could be deprived of
redress simply by vhtue of the fact that the wrongdoer was a federal rather than
state official. The only way to remedy this inequity was to create a damages
cause of action based upon the Constitution itself. In so doing, the Court put
teeth into the Constitution by ruling that a violation of a constitutional right
would portend at least the same result as a violation of a common-law right-
damages. This grand scheme has not, however, come to fruition.
Cases decided subsequent to the Bivens decision lead one to the unmistaka-
ble conclusion that what the Supreme Court created was a right without a mean-
ingful remedy. The emergence of the constitutional tort forced the Court to
strike a balance between protecting the rights of individuals to seek redress for
violations of their constitutional rights and ensuring that the proper functioning
of government is not hindered by a plethora of insubstantial lawsuits. In over-
emphasizing the threat to the governing function, the Court has struck this bal-
ance in such a manner as effectively to eviscerate the right it created in Bivens.
This Article examines the implementation of Bivens and some of the rea-
sons why the doctrine has failed to achieve its primary purpose of providing a
meaningful remedy to the victims of constitutional deprivations. The Article
provides a framework by which to approach such actions and attempts to clarify
some of the confusion surrounding the Bivens action-confusion which one
might have predicted under a case which includes in its title "unknown named"
agents as defendants.11
7. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
8. Id. at 397.
9. Constitutional tort cases are generally described as either a § 1983 or a Bivens case.
10. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 662, 651 (1980)).
11. In the words of Professor Davis, "[C]ourts of appeals have followed each other in misun-
derstandings of Bivens." 5 K. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27:26, at 153 (2d ed.
1984). A good deal of the confusion derives from the fact that Bivens was an entirely new cause of
action with no precedents or legislative history to guide the courts. The Bivens doctrine was created
in 1971 and its forerunner, the suit for damages for a constitutional tort committed by a state actor,
came into being just 10 years earlier in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Only in the last five
years have enough Bivens cases reached the Supreme Court to begin to develop a substantial body of
law. Many questions, however, remain for the lower courts to address in the application of the
Bivens doctrine.
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Part I of the Article discusses the history of the constitutional tort, the
evolution of the Bivens action, and the rationale which supported the Supreme
Court's creation of the Bivens cause of action. Part II examines whether the
Bivens action is achieving the purposes for which it was created. Part III re-
views the formidable obstacles a Bivens plaintiff faces in attempting to obtain a
recovery under a system that has tilted considerably in favor of the federal de-
fendant. Finally, Part IV examines what can be done to balance the govern-
ment's need to function efficiently with the rights of citizens to seek redress for
violations of their constitutional rights.12
I. HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT AND
THE BIVENS CAUSE OF ACTION
For nearly a hundred years, the general view was that the Civil Rights Stat-
utes, in particular 42 U.S.C. § 1983,13 were limited to the redress of an unconsti-
tutional action specifically authorized by a state.14 Constitutional deprivations
caused by the local police officer who conducted an illegal search or the sheriff
who wrongfully placed a person in custody were considered beyond their official
authority and therefore not actionable. The courts reasoned that because con-
duct beyond an official's authority is not "state action," such conduct was not
redressable under section 1983. A remedy, if any existed, was to be found under
some common-law tort. 15
Justice Blackmun, reviewing the history of the Civil Rights Statutes, found
them, from the time of their inception until the 1940s, to be essentially useless as
a method to redress constitutional wrongs: "[A]s the 20th century dawned, the
Nation's commitment to civil rights lay in remnants. It was our Dark Age of
Civil Rights .... As one can see, from the 1890's to the 1940's, the Civil Rights
12. Bivens actions and actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are quite similar. Both seek redress for
constitutional deprivations by government officials, the former for actions of federal officials, and the
latter for those of state officials. In many respects the case law decided with regard to one type of
case can be applied to the other. For instance, with regard to immunity from constitutional torts,
Bivens suits and § 1983 actions are considered essentially identical. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.
Ct. 3034, 3044 n.2 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
n.30 (1982) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978))); see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 340 n.2 (1986). However, as discussed in more detail infra, Part III (D), some considerable
differences between a Bivens action and a § 1983 action exist which make it much more difficult to
obtain a recovery if one's constitutional rights happen to have been violated by a federal rather than
a state official. For this reason this Article, while referring throughout to § 1983 actions, will focus
on the Bivens cause of action.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
14. Pape, 365 U.S. at 195, 208-09 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
15. Id.; see Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. RV. 1133,
1170-75 (1977).
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Act lay virtually dormant." 16
In the 1940s the Supreme Court began to alter its view of "state action." In
two cases in particular, 17 the Court broadened the scope of "state action" to
include any "misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." 18 As
Justice Blackmun noted, "Classic and Screws signalled a general relaxation of
the strict 'state action' requirement that had shackled the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and its enforcing Civil Rights Acts since Reconstruction." 19 Although the
notion of "state action" was expanded by these decisions, damages recoveries
generally were still limited to actions based on the enforcement of official state
policy.20
It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court applied its broader "state
action" definition to a suit for damages under section 1983. In Monroe v. Pape
the Court found that the victim of an illegal search and detainment could obtain
damages from the arresting officers for their violation of the plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights.21 In applying a definition of "state action" which would
include the routine acts of government, the Court released the bonds which had
remained on the Civil Rights Statutes for ninety years by permitting a meaning-
ful affirmative remedy for most deprivations of one's constitutional rights caused
by a state official.
While victims of the acts of state officials could now rely upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, victims of virtually identical acts committed by federal officials had no
similar statutory right to a damages action. Section 1983, by its express word-
ing, may be applied only to actions of persons acting "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia."' 22 There was simply no law that authorized redress for depriva-
tion by a federal official of a constitutional right.
The Supreme Court was not unaware that a double standard existed con-
cerning the protection of one's constitutional rights. As the Court later noted:
The 1983 action was provided to vindicate federal constitutional
rights. That Congress decided, after the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to enact legislation specifically requiring state officials to
respond in federal court for their failures to observe the constitutional
limitations on their powers is hardly a reason for excusing their federal
counterparts for the identical constitutional transgressions. To create
a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct
16. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Re-
main Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1985). Apparently, only 21 cases were
decided under § 1983 through 1920. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 27 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
17. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
18. Screws, 325 U.S. at 109.
19. Blackmun, supra note 16, at 17.
20. See, eg., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1939); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 85-87
(1932).
21. Pape, 365 U.S. at 187.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see supra note 6.
[Vol. 67
BIVENS DOCTRINE
of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the
constitutional design on its head.23
In an effort to remedy this inequitable situation, the Supreme Court decided
Bivens. In Bivens the Court stated, "it is... well settled that where legal rights
have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for
such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the
wrong done." 24 In Bivens the plaintiff sued directly under the Constitution for
money damages arising from his illegal search and seizure by federal narcotics
officers. Lacking any statutory basis for such an award, the Court inferred from
the Constitution a right to obtain relief for the deprivation of one's fourth
amendment rights by a federal official: "[W]here federally protected rights have
been invaded, it has been the rule from the begiming that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."'25
The relief or remedy the Court created to accompany this newly recognized
right was damages:
The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an
injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth
Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury through a particu-
lar remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts. "The
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every indi-
vidual to claim protection of the laws, whenever he receives an in-
jury." . . . [W]e hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money
damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' viola-
tion of the Amendment. 2
6
The damages remedy created in Bivens was not to be recovered from the federal
government. Instead, the Court ruled, without discussion, that the damages to
which the victim was entitled could be garnered only from the individual federal
official who committed the violation. Although nowhere mentioned in the ma-
jority opinion, the Court apparently assumed that the United States had sover-
eign immunity from a claim for damages based upon the Constitution.2 7 Courts
and juries were therefore left to look to the Park Service policeman, the INS
official, or the FBI agent to be financially responsible for the actions each took
on behalf of the federal government.
While the Bivens decision has been decried by numerous critics as a prime
example of judicial activism and overreaching, the Bivens cause of action contin-
ues to exist in the absence of any statute authorizing it.28 The right to obtain
23. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
24. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
25. Id. at 392 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684).
26. Id. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 163 (1803)). "Historically, dam-
ages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty." Id.
at 395.
27. The only statement to this effect was in the concurrence of Justice Harlan, 403 U.S. at 410;
see United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
28. The criticism started with the dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court's Bivens decision.
The dissenting Justices argued that the majority's holding infringed upon the legislative function of
Congress. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 421-22 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 427-30 (Black, J., dissenting).
Similar sentiments were expressed by other Justices in subsequent cases. In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
1989]
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damages from a federal official for a constitutional violation has been extended
from the fourth amendment violation present in Bivens to the right to seek dam-
ages for violation of the first,29 fifth, 30 sixth,31 and eighth32 amendments. In-
deed, courts have generally viewed Bivens actions to apply to the full panoply of
rights contained in the Constitution.33
The Bivens decision seemingly put constitutional violations by a federal offi-
cial on a par with those committed by state officials. It created a right for an
individual like Webster Bivens to obtain meaningful redress for the deprivation
of his constitutional rights through a suit for damages.34 In practice, however,
this newly recognized right has remained virtually untapped. In retrospect, the
Supreme Court's Bivens opinion has had a much less sweeping impact than one
would have anticipated in 1971 when the case was decided.
367, 372-74 (1983), Justice Stevens questioned whether a cause of action would have been inferred
directly from the Constitution had Bivens been decided at that time. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 32-44 (1980), Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that it was incorrect to infer judicially a
damages remedy in the absence of statutory authority. Compare Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering
the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1117, 1135-38 (1978) (Bivens is a constitutional
decision because it prevents the fourth amendment from being rendered a "mere form of words")
with Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1975) (Bivens
is a common-law decision in keeping with "the long federal common law practice of articulating the
remedial implications of federal statutory rights"). See also Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 157 (2d
Cir. 1978) (en bane) ("Few opinions have stirred as much debate as Bivens."), vacated sub nom.,
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 439 U.S. 974, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978).
29. Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 26 (7th Cir. 1978); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 195
(D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (government officials liable
for damages when performance of discretionary duties clearly violate known statutory or constitu-
tional rights); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 n.27, 749 (1982) (although assuming that
private claim may be inferred under first amendment, Court held President of United States abso-
lutely immune from damages for his official actions); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (the
Court, although not specifically recognizing a Bivens cause of action for first amendment violations,
addressed the issue of immunity from such an alleged violation.); ef Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
390 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring) (the Court assumed a first amendment violation but found that
a Bivens action would not lie because the termination of a federal employee covered by a comprehen-
sive statutory scheme by which the employee can challenge his dismissal is a "factor counseling
hesitation" against inferring a Bivens remedy). Also, see infra text accompanying notes 125-42 (dis-
cussion of the "factors counseling hesitation" doctrine).
30. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 249 (1979).
31. Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir.
1974); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 162 (D.D.C. 1976).
32. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17-18.
33. See Bennett v. Campbell, 564 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1977). Bivens actions have been
brought against federal officials for a myriad of allegedly illegal activities, including wiretapping of
other federal employees, Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and members of
the press, Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1986); improper incarceration, Bryan v.
Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865 (1976); unlawful search and seizure,
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389; personnel actions taken in response to the exercise of first amendment rights,
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802; and inadequate medical care rising to the level of cruel and unusual punish-
ment, Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16.
34. After remand from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
in Bivens that there was no immunity for the individual federal officials. Bivens v. Six Unlmown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972). The case was
later settled, with each defendant paying Mr. Bivens $100. See Hernandez v. Lattimore, 454 F.
Supp. 763, 767 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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II. BIVENS HAS NOT ACHIEVED ITS PRIMARY GOAL
Although the Bivens cause of action has had several important effects, 35
including the deterrence of federal officials from violating constitutional rights
and the development and refinement of such rights,3 6 its primary purpose has
always been to redress constitutional deprivations committed by federal offi-
cials.37 The Supreme Court created the Bivens doctrine for the express and sole
purpose of providing a damages remedy to the victims of constitutional torts.
38
That purpose has simply not been achieved.
The number of civil rights actions filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, excluding
suits by federal prisoners, rose from 296 in 1960 to 14,741 by 1981. 39 A similar
increase occurred in Bivens actions. Over 12,000 actions have been filed since
Bivens was decided in 1971. 40 By 1982 roughly one out of every 300 federal
officials was named as a defendant in a pending Bivens action.4 1 As of May
1985, over 2,600 Bivens suits involving over 10,000 present and former federal
officials were pending.42 Justice Blackmun's warning in his dissent in Bivens
that the Court's decision "opens the door for another avalanche of new federal
cases," has proven to be quite prophetic. 4 3
While federal officials have been inundated by Bivens lawsuits, adverse
judgments have not been a problem. Of the some 12,000 Bivens suits filed, only
thirty have resulted in judgments on behalf of plaintiffs. 44 Of these, a number
35. Professor Schuck contends that constitutional tort cases serve five primary goals: "to deter
wrongdoing, to encourage vigorous decisionmaking by officials, to compensate victims of official
misconduct, to exemplify society's moral principles, and to achieve institutional competence and
legitimacy." P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 16(1983).
36. See Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Courts Implement the New Standard for Quali-
fied Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 903 n.6 (1984).
37. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392, 395-97; see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978); Note,
"Damages or Nothing"- The Efficacy of the Bivens Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 667, 668
(1979) ("A Bivens-type action, therefore, accomplishes its purpose only when a deserving plaintiff
recovers damages.").
38. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
39. See Comment, supra note 36, at 200. The total number of nonprison civil rights cases in the
federal courts of appeals rose from 44 in 1960 to 2,661 in 1980. Id.
40. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,021, 27,022 (July 29, 1986); see also Hearings on Title XIII ofS. 829- To
Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings - S.
829] (statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of
Justice).
41. Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearings on S. 1775 Before the Subcomm. on Agency Administra-
tion of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings - S.
1775] (statement of Donald J. Devine, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management).
42. Written Statement of John 3. Farley, III, Director, Torts Branch, Civil Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, to the Litigation Section of the Bar of the District of Columbia (May 1985), at 1
[hereinafter Farley Statement]. The number of pending cases was nearly 3,000 by July 1986. 51
Fed. Reg. 27,022 (1986).
43. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority in Bivens specifically ad-
dressed this concern of Justice Blackmun and predicted that no such avalanche would occur. Id. at
391 n.4.
44. Farley Statement, supra note 42, at 1; see also Federal Tort Claims: Hearings on HR. 595
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary
Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings - HR. 595] (statement of J. Paul
McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, listing the ex-
1989]
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have been reversed on appeal and only four judgments have actually been paid
by the individual federal defendants. 45 Moreover, very few Bivens cases have
settled with any money paid to the plaintiff.46
A number of the Bivens suits filed since 1971 have no doubt lacked merit.
Criminal defendants often use Bivens suits as weapons in their defense. Follow-
ing the maxim that the best defense is a good offense, a company which has been
cited for violations by government inspectors or a criminal defendant who has
been searched might file a Bivens action as leverage in their criminal cases, alleg-
ing that the searches in question were unconstitutional. Given the chance, many
federal employees, no matter how loyal, would seriously contemplate dismissing
criminal charges or withdrawing civil penalties if taking such action would elim-
inate their exposure to personal liability for actions taken while fulfilling their
governmental duties. The paucity of victories for plaintiffs alleging deprivation
of their constitutional rights demonstrates, however, more than a propensity by
the general public to bring frivolous lawsuits against federal officials. It reflects,
instead, problems endemic to the Bivens action which have created an almost
insurmountable bias against the plaintiff.4 7
As will be discussed below, Bivens plaintiffs have been deprived of a mean-
ingfixl remedy because the courts have created innumerable obstacles to ob-
taining a recovery against wrongdoing federal officials. The courts have tipped
the balance so far in favor of the concern for the proper functioning of govern-
ment that the primary purpose of the Bivens action-the right of an aggrieved
isting 16 judgments out of the 10,000 Bivens cases filed as of that date); Hearings - S. 829, supra
note 40, at 11 (testimony of IRS Commissioner, Roscoe L. Egger, Jr., that of the 547 Bivens suits
against IRS agents, there have been no judgments); Hearings - S. 1775, supra note 41, at 3 (testi-
mony of FBI Director William H. Webster that of the over 600 Bivens cases filed against FBI agents,
there have been only three judgments, two of which are on appeal).
45. Farley Statement, supra note 42, at 1. Examples of Bivens judgments reversed on appeal
include Nees v. Bishop, 730 F.2d 606, 613 (10th Cir. 1984); Doran v. Houle, 721 F.2d 1182, 1188-89
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
46. See Note, supra note 37, at 668-69 (reporting that of the 172 Bivens cases surveyed by the
author only three percent involved judgments for the plaintiffs and only three percent involved any
type of settlement); see also Hearings - . 829, supra note 40, at 6-7, (testimony of FBI Director
William H. Webster, stating that settling a case is "something an individual Bivens defendant is
unlikely to do"). A Bivens defendant is unlikely to settle with any type of money being paid out
because the success rate for such defendants (99.75% before appeal) is so high. The defendant has
no incentive to settle to avoid having to pay his attorneys' fees because any federal employee sued for
actions taken within the scope of his employment receives free representation from the Department
of Justice. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (1987). If there is any conflict of interest which would prevent the
government from representing the federal official, the government will hire private counsel for the
employee. Id. § 50.15(a)(6).
47. A number of commentators have observed that the Bivens action is not achieving its pur-
pose. For example, Thomas J. Madden, former General Counsel of the Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice, stated, "I think we all agree by this time that
the Bivens remedy is not satisfactorily serving the purpose it was fashioned by the Supreme Court to
promote; that is, assuring adequate compensation of the victim, measured deterrence of official
wrongdoing, and fairness in the administration ofjustice." Hearings- S. 829, supra note 40, at 52.
The Administrative Conference of the United States, an independent agency of the United States
government, has likewise recognized this problem: "The existing system of civil sanctions for consti-
tutional violations by Federal officials does not provide adequate assurance of compensation for
victims of such violations and discourages proper conduct by Government officials." 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.82-6 (1987).
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citizen to obtain damages for a constitutional deprivation-has become an
empty and unfulfilled promise.4 8
III. THE OBSTACLES To A BIVENS RECOVERY
A. Procedural Advantages Accorded to Bivens Defendants
From the moment the Bivens plaintiff files his lawsuit he faces the realiza-
tion that he is not competing on a level playing field. First, the plaintiff must
plead the alleged constitutional tort with greater specificity than other claims.4 9
Although not a particularly oppressive requirement, specifically pleading exactly
what actions occurred, when, and by whom, may be a difficult task for the vic-
tim of an unlawful search or the subject of an illegal arrest. People who are
subjected to misconduct by law enforcement officials often lack pertinent infor-
mation about the incident, including in some instances the names of the govern-
ment officials involved.
Courts have also construed jurisdiction, venue, and other preliminary issues
in Bivens suits so as to favor the individual government defendant. For exam-
ple, for the purpose of filing an answer to a complaint a Bivens defendant is
considered an "officer of the United States" and may therefore take sixty days to
respond, rather than the normal twenty days afforded to nongovernmental de-
fendants.50 At the same time, a Bivens defendant may not be served as an "of-
ficer of the United States" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(5), 51 nor
may a plaintiff obtain venue in a Bivens action under 28 U.S.C § 1391(e), which
allows a plaintiff to bring an action in the district in which the plaintiff resides in
suits against "an officer or employee of the United States."'5 2
While not insurmountable, these procedural advantages work to discourage
plaintiffs from bringing Bivens actions. If the plaintiff can overcome these pre-
liminary hurdles, he then encounters much more difficult problems, still at the
48. This view has not been shared by all commentators throughout the evolution of Bivens law.
For example, one observer warned in 1981 that recent decisions of the Supreme Court had greatly
expanded the potential liability of federal officials while greatly restricting their ability to claim im-
munity to constitutional tort suits. Schuck, Suing Our Servants" The Court, Congress and the Lia-
bility of Public Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 281, 284-85 (1981).
49. Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Huilman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553,
556-57 (11th Cir. 1984); Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1977).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a):
51. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(5) provides:
The summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person
making service with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
(5) Upon an officer or agency of the United States, by serving the United States and by send-
ing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to such officer or
agency. If the agency is a corporation the copy shall be delivered as provided in paragraph (3) of this
subdivision of this rule.
52. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1980) (dicta); see 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1107 (1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(5) and 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e) apply only when federal officials are sued in their official governmental capacity
(for example, when sued for injunctive relief) rather than when sued in their personal capacity for
damages.
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initial stages of the litigation.53
B. The Government's Sovereign Immunity
Despite the Supreme Court's foray into the legislative function in creating
the Bivens cause of action, the Court apparently assumed it could not go so far
as to extend liability to the government in the absence of a waiver of sovereign
immunity by Congress. As Justice Harlan wrote in his concurrence in Bivens,
"[h]owever desirable a direct remedy against the Government might be as a sub-
stitute for individual official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to
suit."'5 4 Curiously, this statement by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion is
the only statement by the Supreme Court implying that the government's tradi-
tional sovereign immunity to common-law torts applies equally to suits brought
for violations of the Constitution.
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue, the
lower courts have assumed that the United States is immune from constitutional
torts absent a waiver by Congress: "While Bivens created a federal tort for cer-
tain violations of the Fourth Amendment, it did not (and indeed could not)
impose liability on the officer's employer, the federal government. The federal
fisc was protected by the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity."55
Although Congress has waived the government's sovereign immunity for
most common-law torts56 and contract actions,57 it has not done so for constitu-
tional torts.58 Therefore, under the assumption made by the courts that the
federal government is immune from such actions, any damages that a plaintiff is
to recover in a Bivens suit must come from the individual federal employee who
committed the wrong.59 Moreover, the employee will not be indemnified or re-
imbursed by the federal government.6° While such a result undoubtedly has a
53. For a further discussion of the special procedural rules applicable in aBivens case, see Note,
Quick Termination of Insubstantial Civil Rights Clains" Qualified Immunity and Procedural Fair-
ness, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1543 (1985).
54. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring). For a discussion of the roots of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity as it relates to Bivens actions, see Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity
After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 597 (1982).
55. Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003
(1978); see Williamson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1987); Hohri v.
United States, 782 F.2d 227, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 454 (1986); Arnsberg v.
United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986); Keene Corp. v.
United States, 700 F.2d 836, 845 n.13 (2d Cir. 1983); e. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1976) (government not liable for backpay to employee classified incorrectly under the classification
act). But see infra text accompanying notes 220-234.
56. Most common-law tort actions may be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (Herein-
after FTCA], 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 to 2680 (1982).
57. Contract actions may be brought under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
58. See infra text accompanying notes 215-20 for a discussion of the bills introduced in Con-
gress over the last 15 years which have sought to amend the FTCA to include constitutional torts.
59. "A suit for money damages... must be paid out of the pocket of the private individual who
happens to be-or formerly was-employed by the Federal Government. .. ." Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U.S. 527, 542 (1980) (dicta).
60. "If an employee suffers an adverse judgment, with very few exceptions, it is he or she who
must pay it." Hearings - S. 1775, supra note 41, at 160 (statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant
Attorney General, Justice Department).
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deterrent effect on potentially wrongful actions of federal employees, it appears
to have an even stronger deterrent effect on judges and juries finding liability
against the defendant. 61
The simple reality is that judges and juries are extremely reluctant to render
judgments causing federal employees personally to pay thousands of dollars for
actions taken pursuant to their government employment.62 Indeed, the govern-
ment predicted as much in its briefs to the Supreme Court in Bivens. The Court
explained, "as the Government contends, damages will rarely be realized by
plaintiffs in these cases because of jury hostility, the limited resources of the
official concerned, etc." 63 Bivens cases most often involve a government em-
ployee just doing his job, such as a low- or midlevel employee who was carrying
out some program enacted by Congress and administered by political appointees
in his agency, or an FBI agent who was risking his life trying to apprehend a
dangerous criminal but who knocked without announcing or allowed his search
of a house to extend beyond the constraints of the warrant. In such cases the
judge or jury has two choices: to rule that the employee, who was diligently and
conscientiously performing his job, must pay from his own pocket, or to find no
liability. Understandably, many judges and juries lean toward the latter alterna-
tive, especially because it is often more difficult to "see" the injury from a consti-
tutional tort, such as the denial of a person's due process, then the injury from a
common-law tort involving personal injury.64
A small number of government agencies have created either formal proce-
dures or informal understandings whereby the agency will indemnify the indi-
vidual employee if a judgment is rendered against her in a Bivens action. For
example, the Department of Justice recently reversed its policy of not indemnify-
ing its employees for Bivens judgments.65 This indemnification, however, is
within the discretion of the Department and does not become effective until a
61. The deterrent effect on the overzealous actions of federal officials results only to the extent
that the officials are aware that they will personally have to satisfy a judgment rendered against them
for actions taken in the scope of their employment. Outside of law enforcement officials who are
frequently sued and their lawyers, many federal employees probably are unaware of such fact.
62. By definition, a defendant can only be held liable in a Bivens action if his acts were under-
taken "within the outer perimeter of his [federal] duties." Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756
(1982).
63. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
64. It would, of course, be quite unusual for a judge to state on the record his reluctance to find
for the plaintiff simply because of the identity of the defendants. This sentiment has, however, been
expressed by numerous observers of Bivens actions. Senator Charles E. Grassley summed up this
view in hearings on proposals to amend the FTCA to include constitutional torts:
Federal employees are being increasingly sued for decisions made during the course of a
workday, just doing their job. From forest ranger to Director of the National Cancer
Institute, from meat inspector to Cabinet officer, our entire Federal work force is poten-
tially liable for decisions made in carrying out Federal missions.
Hearings - S. 829, supra note 40, at 2 (statement of Subcommittee Chairman Senator Grassley); see
also 5 K. DAVis, supra note 11, § 27:41 (2d ed. 1984) (suggesting that courts should always inquire
whether a judgment against the employee will be payed by employee or governmental employer);
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 60 (1980) (arguing that it is so distasteful to
hold government officials personally liable for carrying out the actions of the government that they
should not be held liable regardless of the fact that the United States has not waived its sovereign
immunity-no remedy at all is better than one against the federal employee).
65. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,021-22 (1986).
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judgment is actually rendered. 66 Notwithstanding these limited situations where
the government will contribute to the verdict, in the eyes of the judge or the jury,
the federal employee is still standing before them without the U.S. Treasury to
back up her actions. Therefore, a major stumbling block for the Bivens plaintiff
is the assumed sovereign immunity of the United States which results in a great
reluctance on the part of the factfinder to hold the individual government official
financially responsible for an act of government.
C. The Defense of Qualified Immunity
As difficult as it is for the Bivens plaintiff to overcome the bias resulting
from the government's sovereign immunity, it is a different type of immunity
which presents his most formidable obstacle to recovery. The defense of quali-
fied immunity has developed into the linchpin of the defense to virtually every
Bivens action.
1. The Rationale for Qualified Immunity
When a government official is sued for a constitutional tort he typically
responds to the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss, contending that he has
qualified immunity from such action. The doctrine of qualified immunity is an
attempt to reconcile two competing interests. It is designed to permit aggrieved
individuals to seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights while at
the same time protecting federal officials from the inhibiting effect such suits can
create:
When government officials abuse their offices, "action[s] for damages
may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees." .. . On the other hand, permitting damage suits against
government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the
risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation
will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties. Our cases
have accommodated these conflicting concerns by generally providing
government officials performing discretionary functions with a quali-
fied immunity, shielding them from civil damages liability as long as
their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the
rights they are alleged to have violated. 67
By providing defendants with qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has
in effect made the right to sue for a constitutional deprivation a conditional
right. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, the plaintiff's ability to seek
66. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(c)(1) (1987). The Department will entertain a request to indemnify or
settle a claim prior to a judgment only in exceptional circumstances. Id. § 50.15(c)(3).
67. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 814 (1982)). As the Court stated in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959):
It has been thought important that officials of government should be free to exercise their
duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect of acts done in the course of
those duties-suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be
devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the
fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government.
Id. at 571.
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redress disappears if the federal official who violated his rights was acting in
"good faith." The immunity applies regardless of how meritorious the plain-
tiff's claim may be: "[T]his Court always has recognized, however, that official
immunity comes at a great cost. An injured party with an otherwise meritorious
tort claim is denied compensation simply because he had the misfortune to be
injured by a federal official."' 68 The Supreme Court therefore has struck a bal-
ance which admittedly allows legitimate claims of constitutional violations to go
unredressed for the "greater good."'6
9
2. Absolute Immunity Distinguished
The defense of qualified immunity to a constitutional tort differs from the
various forms of absolute immunity which, unlike qualified immunity, impose an
unconditional bar to recovery.70 Persons accorded absolute immunity include
judges,7 1 prosecutors, 72 legislators, 73 witnesses, 74 and the President. 75 In each
of these cases the individual receives unconditional immunity for all acts taken
as part of the function the immunity is designed to protect.76 For instance, a
prosecutor will not be protected for actions taken while observing a strip search
68. Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. CL 580, 583 (1988).
69. Judge Learned Hand, in the oft-quoted case of Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950), explained the application of the immunity doctrine and how
it protects even those federal officials who act out of a wholly vindictive or personal motive:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to
vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public
good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in
practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery.
The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well
founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as
the guilty, to the burden of trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn
out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard
put to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public
officials who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from expos-
ing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their
errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils
inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to
leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do
their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.
Id. at 581.
70. For a discussion of the historical basis for official immunity, see Matasar, Personal Immuni-
ties Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court's Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REv. 741 (1987).
71. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). This
immunity applies only to "judicial" functions, which do not include a judge's hiring and firing of
court personnel. Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 544-46 (1988).
72. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976).
73. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616-22 (1972); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
376-77 (1951). The Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution which provides absolute immu-
nity in this situation does not apply where the alleged wrongful actions are not connected with the
legislator's speech and debate function. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245-48 (1979), Con-
gressman Passman was held to have only qualified immunity from a sex discrimination claim
brought by one of his employees.
74. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983).
75. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
76. Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 544 (1988); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617.
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since such activities are outside of his prosecutorial role.77 Absolute immunity
is accorded to the above-described classes of individuals regardless of whether
the individual is being sued for a common-law or constitutional tort.
Most federal employees not within one of the classifications set out above
and who perform discretionary acts within the outer perimeter of their employ-
ment are absolutely immune from most common-law tort claims, although not
from constitutional torts.78 Absolute immunity for common-law torts for fed-
eral officials has been the general rule since the Supreme Court's 1959 decision in
Barr v. Matteo.79 Therefore, unless one is a judge, prosecutor, legislator, wit-
ness, or the President, all of whom have absolute immunity to both common-law
77. The question of who, or what functions, should be afforded absolute immunity is said to be
derived from history and the common law. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985). The first
known pronouncements of judicial immunity in the Supreme Court and a state court in the United
States were Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 347 (1871), and Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282
(N.Y. 1810). See also Nixon, 457 U.S. at 747 (explaining that the Court's decisions on immunity for
government officials have been "guided by" the Constitution, federal statutes, history, and in the
absence of explicit constitutional or congressional guidance, from common law and public policy).
The result has been an unusual mix of who is accorded absolute immunity. For instance, the chief
executive of the United States has absolute immunity from constitutional torts, id. at 749, while the
chief executive of a state, the governor, does not. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974)
(qualified immunity is available depending on the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the of-
fice). The aides of a Congressman are absolutely immune from constitutional claims, Gravel, 408
U.S. at 616-22, while Cabinet officials and the top advisors to the President are not. Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982).
78. In its last term, the Supreme Court for the first time extended absolute immunity for com-
mon-law torts to certain nongovernmental employees. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108
S. Ct. 2510 (1988), the Court held that a government contractor would be immune from common-
law tort claims resulting from negligently caused design defects in the products they produce "when
(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to
those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States." Id. at 2518. The Court
explained that it was in effect extending the discretionary function exception in the FTCA to govern-
ment contractors. Id. at 2517-18.
Arguing that the majority's decision blatantly usurps Congress' role in this area, the dissent in
Boyle points out that the Court's decision takes the principle of absolute immunity to heights it has
not heretofore been:
The Court-unelected and unaccountable to the people-has unabashedly stepped into the
breach to legislate a rule denying Lt. Boyle's family the compensation that state law assures
them. This time the injustice is of this Court's own making.
Worse yet, the injustice will extend far beyond the facts of this case, for the Court's
newly discovered Government contractor defense is breathtakingly sweeping. It applies
not only to military equipment like the CH-53D helicopter, but (so far as I can tell) to any
made-to-order gadget that the Federal Government might purchase after previewing
plans-from NASA's Challenger space shuttle to the Postal Service's old mail cars. The
contractor may invoke the defense in suits brought not only by military personnel like Lt.
Boyle, or Government employees, but by anyone injured by a Government contractor's
negligent design, including, for example, the children who might have died had respon-
dent's helicopter crashed on the beach. It applies even if the Government has not inten-
tionally sacrificed safety for other interests like speed or efficiency, and, indeed, even if the
equipment is not of a type that is typically considered dangerous; thus, the contractor who
designs a Government building can invoke the defense when the elevator cable snaps or the
walls collapse. And the defense is invocable regardless of how blatant or easily remedied
the defect, so long as the contractor missed it and the specifieations approved by the Gov-
ernment, however unreasonably dangerous, were "reasonably precise."
... In my view, this Court lacks both authority and expertise to fashion such a rule,
whether to protect the Treasury of the United States or the coffers of industry.
Id. at 2518-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1959); see also Butz, 438 U.S. 478, 522 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring
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and constitutional claims, most federal employees generally will be accorded ab-
solute immunity when sued for common-law torts and qualified immunity for
constitutional torts.80 This separate treatment exists even when the common-
law and constitutional claims arise out of the same set of facts or occurrences.
8 1
There has long been some question whether general absolute immunity ap-
plies to all common-law torts. Courts have seriously questioned the notion that
there should be two separate types of immunity depending on how the claim is
pleaded. 82 One explanation may be that because the government has waived
sovereign immunity for most common-law claims through the Federal Tort
Claims Act, there is no need in most cases to sue individual federal officials for
common-law torts. An individual may not, however, sue the government for a
constitutional tort and, therefore, must sue the individual employee if he is to
obtain any recovery. If that employee were granted absolute immunity, there
would be no remedy whatsoever.
The dichotomy between the two types of immunity has been resisted by at
least one circuit court of appeals. In Martin v. Malhoyt83 the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals denied absolute immunity to Federal Park Service police
officers accused of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and other
claims related to defendants' apprehension of plaintiffs. The court concluded
that the reasons supporting absolute immunity from common-law torts-to pro-
tect federal officials from having to address their time and attention to frivolous
lawsuits and to promote aggressive decision making unrestricted by the fear of
subjecting oneself to personal liability 84- are now fully satisfied by the Supreme
Court's present formulation of qualified immunity.85 In the District of Colum-
bia, therefore, qualified immunity applies to both constitutional and common-
law torts. The majority view remains, however, that all federal employees are
and dissenting) (noting that the majority recognizes that executives are absolutely immune from
common-law actions as long as they are within scope of authority).
80. Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-11.
81. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). One set of acts often gives rise to both common law
and constitutional tort claims. For example, an unlawful search may be both a fourth amendment
violation and a battery. A violent arrest involving excessive force will result in claims of battery and
a fifth amendment due process violation. Extreme medical neglect of a prisoner would cause claims
of negligence and an eighth amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See id.
82. Absolute immunity to common-law torts was first raised in Barr, 360 U.S. at 574. The
Supreme Court first applied qualified immunity to a constitutional tort in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 553-58 (1967), a case against state officials brought under the Civil Rights Statutes, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1988 (1958). Qualified immunity was first applied to constitutional tort claims in a Bivens
action in Butz, 438 U.S. at 504-08. Since that time, commentators and at least one Justice have
questioned the use of the two different standards. See, eg., Butz, 438 U.S. at 520 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (noting "the illogic and impracticability of distinguishing between consti-
tutional and common-law claims for purposes of immunity"); 5 K. DAvis, supra note 11, §§ 27:22-
27:24 (observing that the Supreme Court has never adequately explained why there should be two
different standards for immunity).
83. 830 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
84. Barr, 365 U.S. at 571.
85. Martin, 830 F.2d at 250 ("These two concerns, we stress, in the years since Barr, have been
fully incorporated into the federal qualified immunity doctrine."). The court in Martin also noted
that the Supreme Court had never accorded absolute immunity from common-law torts to the ac-
tions of federal law enforcement officials. Id. at 249.
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entitled to absolute immunity for most common-law torts.8 6
3. The Application of Qualified Immunity
In order to be entitled to qualified immunity, the federal employee must
first establish that he was "acting within the outer perimeter of his employment"
and that the actions at issue were "discretionary. 87 The "outer perimeter" of
one's federal employment is to be broadly construed.88 Even malicious actions,
if conducted generally while on duty as a government official, are within the
Scouter perimeter" of one's federal employment and thus are protected by
immunity.8 9
Similarly, the requirement that the act at issue be discretionary has also
been construed broadly or, more often, simply ignored.90 While the Supreme
Court has recently affirmed the requirement that a federal official's acts must be
discretionary in order to be accorded immunity, the Court did little to clarify the
standard by which the lower courts are to judge whether an allegedly unconsti-
tutional act was discretionary in nature.91 If the defendant can satisfy the
broadly interpreted "scope" and "discretion" requirements, the court then
moves on to apply the test for qualified immunity.
86. See, eg., Owyhee Grazing Ass'n v. Field, 637 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1981); Miller v.
DeLaune, 602 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir. 1979).
87. Butz, 438 U.S. at 522 (Rehnquist, J., concurring and dissenting); Barr, 360 U.S. at 574.
88. See, eg., Simons v. Bellinger, 643 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The court in Simons stated:
The Supreme Court has declared that, with respect to immunity, 'jurisdiction' ought to be
defined broadly to include acts 'having more or less connection with the general matters
committed by law' to the official's supervision. In other words, an act is within the offi-
cial's jurisdiction if it is not 'manifestly or palpably beyond his authority.'
Id. at 786 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 482, 498 (1896)). This broad construction applies
even when the employee's conduct was clearly misguided or wrongful. Evans v. Wright, 582 F.2d
20, 21 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). A supervisor accused of battery on his employee has been held to be
acting within the scope of his authority. Dretar v. Smith, 752 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir. 1985). But
see Araujo v. Welch, 742 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984) (battery of subordinate found to be beyond the
outer perimeter of a federal employee's duty); McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(federal employees exceed outer perimeters of responsibilities when they use physical force to compel
obedience of subordinates).
89. The Supreme Court in Butz quoted from Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), to help
explain the expansive interpretation of the "outer perimeter" requirement: "Because the Postmaster
General in issuing the circular in question 'did not exceed his authority, nor pass the line of his
duty,' it was irrelevant that he might have acted maliciously." Butz, 438 U.S. at 492 (quoting Spald-
ing, 161 U.S. at 499).
90. See, eg., Williamson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 380 (5th Cir. 1987);
Poolman v. Nelson, 802 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1986).
91. In Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580, 584 (1988), the Supreme Court again declared that
only federal officials performing discretionary acts are entitled to absolute immunity. The Court
found defendants' decision to store toxic soda ash at an Army depot to be a nondiscretionary act and
denied defendants immunity for the injuries suffered by plaintiff. Id. at 585. The Court reasoned
that such a decision would not generally be inhibited by the threat of a lawsuit and therefore was not
discretionary. Id. Beyond this, however, the Court did little toward creating any type of uniform
standard by which to judge what acts are discretionary for the purpose of applying official immunity.
Instead, the Court reverted to the rather nebulous balancing test it first announced in Doe v. McMil-
lan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973): "[A]bsolute immunity for federal officials is justified only when 'the contri-
butions of immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the perhaps recurring
harm to individual citizens.'" Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 583 (quoting Doe, 412 U.S. at 320).
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As originally formulated, the qualified immunity or good faith defense was
measured by a two-prong test. In Wood v. Strickland 92 the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the defendant was entitled to immunity from suit if he could estab-
lish both objective and subjective good faith.93 A federal official would be
presumed to be immune unless it could be shown that he "knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsi-
bility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the
action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
or other injury."'94
The two-prong test for immunity requiring the official to establish that he
did not knowingly violate an individual's constitutional rights and that his ac-
tions were not those which a reasonable official would have known to be uncon-
stitutional, could in most cases be easily satisfied. Moreover, the Supreme Court
established a procedural framework which would make it as likely as possible
that a federal official could obtain immunity under the Wood v. Strickland test.
In addressing the issue of when the question of qualified immunity should be
decided, the Court admonished that "damages suits concerning constitutional
violations need not proceed to trial but can be terminated on a properly sup-
ported motion for summary judgment based on the defense of immunity." 95
The Supreme Court warned the lower courts to apply the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure firmly, so as to ensure that insubstantial Bivens suits were dismissed
at the initial stages of the litigation.96
The Court's direction to the lower courts to decide the immunity issue on
pretrial motions would not appear to be particularly onerous if the parties were
on equal footing with regard to such motions. However, in deciding such mo-
tions the courts are generally prohibited from permitting plaintiffs to engage in
any discovery. The Supreme Court has mandated that "[u]ntil this threshold
immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed."' 97 The premise
behind prohibiting discovery is that qualified immunity protects the government
employee not only from a monetary judgment but also from being subjected to
92. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
93. Id. at 321.
94. Id. at 322.
95. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508; see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 n.35 (1982) (the
Court reiterated this "admonishment"); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) for this principle), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984).
96. Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibili-
ties of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief under the
Federal Constitution, it should not survive a motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Court rec-
ognized in Scheuer that damages suits concerning constitutional violations need not pro-
ceed to trial, but can be terminated on a properly supported motion for summary judgment
based on the defense of immunity. In responding to such a motion, plaintiffs may not play
dog in the manger; and firm application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will ensure
that federal officials are not harassed by frivolous lawsuits.
Butz, 438 U.S. at 507-08.
97. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (indicating that
frivolous discovery should be avoided); Smith v. Nixon, 807 F.2d 197, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (exalting
the rule in Harlow preempting discovery); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 807 F.2d 204, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
(discovery should not be allowed in light of inadequate complaint), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 197
(1987).
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suit at all.98 Thus, without any discovery, the Bivens plaintiff must establish that
the government official violated his constitutional rights and that he was not
acting in "good faith," all just in order to avoid summary judgment.99
In creating the "good faith" test for qualified immunity the Supreme Court
realized it was weighted in favor of the defendant. Recognizing that it had pro-
vided maximum protection for the federal employee through the Wood v. Strick-
land two-prong text, the Court admitted that "[a]ny lesser standard would deny
much of the promise of § 1983 [and Bivens actions]." 1°° It did not take long,
however, for the Court to alter the standard so as to tip the scales even further in
favor of the government official.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald the Supreme Court found the "subjective element of
the good-faith defense frequently.., incompatible with our admonition in Butz
that insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial." 10 1 The Supreme Court
recognized that the lower courts had found it virtually impossible to follow its
directive that qualified immunity be decided on summary judgment, without dis-
covery, when one-half of the good faith test involved the fact-specific question of
the subjective intent of the defendant. In response to this dilemma, the Supreme
Court simply eliminated the subjective element of the test.102
The new test for applying qualified immunity, termed the "objective reason-
ableness" or "clearly established" test, holds that "government officials perform-
ing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."103
Under the new test, a federal official who knew he was violating the clearly
established constitutional rights of the plaintiff or who acted with malicious in-
tent to violate those rights would still be immune so long as a reasonable official
would not have been aware that the actions at issue violated clearly established
law.'1 4 Thus, a qualified immunity test already tilting toward the defendant (to
be decided on summary judgment, without discovery) was further tilted in that
direction with the elimination of the subjective element of the "good faith" test.
98. "The entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a defense to liability; and like an
absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell,
472 U.S. at 526; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816 (describing the general and special costs of subject-
ing officials to risks of trial).
99. The defense of qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded in the
defendant's initial response to the complaint. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). As an
affirmative defense, the burden of proof technically lies with the government official claiming to be
immune from suit. Id. In practice, however, it is often the plaintiff who must disprove immunity.
When a defendant makes a colorable (but not necessarily convincing) argument for immunity, the
judge is almost precluded from denying the defendant's motion to dismiss since to do so and to send
the case to trial or even discovery destroys the purpose of the immunity. See supra note 98.
100. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
101. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
102. Id. at 816-19; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 517 (explaining that in Harlow the Court had
"purged [the] qualified immunity doctrine of its subjective components").
103. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
104. "Harlow precludes monetary relief for a violation of constitutional rights by an officer who
knows he is acting unlawfully, so long as the law enforcement community in general considers his
conduct arguably proper." Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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With the subjective element gone, the task of applying the clearly estab-
lished test on summary judgment and without discovery has proved easier but
still difficult. First, the courts are somewhat unclear on how to determine
whether the law was clearly established at the time of the incident. The
Supreme Court has already ruled that a government official does not necessarily
violate "clearly established" law even though he violated an agency regulation
governing his conduct.10 5
Instead, the test apparently requires that some case law exist declaring con-
duct of the type at issue to be unconstitutional. The question is "what type of
case law?" Must there be a Supreme Court case on point, or a circuit court case,
or some district court cases, and how many? The Supreme Court has attempted
to provide some guidance in this area. In Anderson v. Creighton 10 6 the Court
explained:
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immu-
nity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlaw-
ful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness
must be apparent. 107
While the Court has arguably set up a standard by which to judge whether
prior law was clearly established, judges will certainly have to wrestle with this
difficult question on a case-by-case basis. Because immunity applies unless the
official violated law that was "clearly established," any uncertainty will provide
immunity for the defendant. Understandably, commentators have criticized the
new test as unduly biased against the victim of the constitutional tort.' 0 8
Even when established law is clear, many courts have found it difficult to
determine, without discovery, whether a reasonable person would have believed
he was violating clearly established law when the circumstances surrounding the
alleged unconstitutional actions are in dispute.10 9 For instance, when an FBI
agent swears in an affidavit that he conducted a warrantless search with prob-
able cause and under exigent circumstances, and the plaintiff avers that there
was no reason to believe he had committed a crime or that he would be leaving
the scene or that evidence would be destroyed, how does a judge determine
105. Davis v. Scheuer, 468 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1984). The Supreme Court held that defendant
superior officers did not violate clearly established law under the due process clause even though
they failed to provide a hearing to plaintiff employee whom they fired. The Court so ruled despite
defendants' violation of a government regulation directing them to conduct a thorough investigation
and to provide the employee with the opportunity to submit a written statement in his defense prior
to the firing. The Court stated that government regulations simply have no bearing on whether the
constitutional right was clearly established, even where, as in this case, the government regulation
was arguably an attempt to set down the established law in a personnel handbook so that it would be
available to the myriad workers who do not closely follow Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 194-95.
106. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
107. Id. at 3039 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535 n.12).
108. See 5 K. DAvIs, supra note 11, § 27:24; Comment, supra note 36, at 911-13 nn.57-61.
109. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that under the clearly estab-
lished standard discovery may sometimes be necessary); see also McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d
309, 320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (summary judgment for defendant held inappropriate), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1005 (1985).
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
whether a reasonable law enforcement officer would have known he was violat-
ing clearly established law by conducting a warrantless search? Obviously, the
answer would differ depending on which version of facts the judge believed.
Yet, the judge is directed to decide the issue on summary judgment, without
discovery.
Faced with the same dilemma all over again, the Supreme Court may be
ready to concede that its mandate to decide the qualified immunity question
without discovery is, under certain circumstances, unworkable. In Anderson v.
Creighton the Court reiterated that discovery concerning the subjective intent of
the FBI agent accused of an unconstitutional search is irrelevant.10 The Court
found that the defendant would be immune if his acts, as pleaded by plaintiff,
did not violate clearly established law. In a footnote at the end of the opinion,
the Court explained that if the defendant would be immune under his own ver-
sion of the facts, but would be found to have violated clearly established law
under the plaintiff's version, then limited discovery may become necessary. 11
Thus, a Bivens plaintiff with a well-pleaded complaint may now stand a slightly
better chance of surviving the initial summary judgment motion and obtaining
some limited discovery.1 12 Qualified immunity, however, remains the most sub-
stantial obstacle to recovery by a constitutional tort plaintiff.
Even if the plaintiff survives the formidable hurdle of a motion for summary
judgment or a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, she still may not
proceed to proving the substance of her allegations. Because qualified immunity
protects the government official from any involvement in a lawsuit, a denial of a
motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on immunity is immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 113 In addition, to further protect
defendants from having to submit to discovery and trial, many courts will grant
a stay of all discovery and trial court proceedings pending the outcome of the
110. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3038-39.
111. The footnote reads:
Thus, on remand, it should first be determined whether the actions the Creightons allege
Anderson to have taken are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful. If
they are, then Anderson is entitled to dismissal prior to discovery. If they are not, and if
the actions Anderson claims he took are different from those the Creightons allege (and are
actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful), then discovery may be neces-
sary before Anderson's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can
be resolved. Of course, any such discovery should be tailored specifically to the question of
Anderson's qualified immunity.
Id. at 304243 n.6 (citation ommitted).
112. If the plaintiff reaches this stage he still encounters obstacles which are not present in a
lawsuit against nonfederal officials. For example, in order to depose an employee of the Justice
Department, including an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturali-
zation, or Drug Enforcement Agency who is the subject of the suit, the plaintiff must first submit a
request to the Justice Department for the deposition, outlining the questions which will be asked. 28
C.F.R. § 16.21 (1987).
113. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). This may not be the case, however, where
the action also involves injunctive claims. As the court reasoned in Prisco v. United States, 851 F.2d
93 (3d Cir. 1988), because qualified immunity does not apply to injunctive claims, and since the case
would have to go forward on the injunctive claims regardless of how the court decides the immunity
issue, the purpose for allowing an immediate appeal (to free the official of the rigors and harassment
of a trial) is no longer applicable since the official must sit through the same trial and present the
same evidence to defend against the injunctive claims. Id. at 95-96.
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interlocutory appeal. Therefore, a Bivens plaintiff with a substantial and well-
grounded constitutional tort claim very often has to wait several years before she
can proceed past the complaint stage of her case.
D. Additional Roadblocks Not Present In A Section 1983 Action
As discussed earlier in this Article,' 1 4 the ability to sue a federal employee
for a constitutional tort is not a right accorded by statute, such as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. It is, instead, a right created by the courts. As such, the courts may
burden this right with restrictions which do not apply to a statutorily created
cause of action. A Bivens cause of action is so burdened.
Although the two actions should be similarly interpreted, 115 certain obsta-
cles are present in a Bivens action which do not apply to a section 1983 suit. A
Bivens plaintiff who has had his constitutional rights infringed by a federal offi-
cial in violation of clearly established law such that immunity will not be af-
forded to the government official, will still be deprived of recovery under certain
circumstances. As the Supreme Court explained:
Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a
federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in
federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right.
Such a cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however,
in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate "special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress." The second is when defendants show that Congress has
provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a sub-
stitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as
equally effective. 116
These restrictions, the "special factors" and "alternative remedy" restrictions,
do not apply in a section 1983 case.
1. The "Alternative Remedy" Restriction
If Congress has created a comprehensive remedy which adequately recom-
penses an individual for the deprivation of her constitutional rights, the plaintiff
will be denied any right to seek additional remedies under Bivens. Of course, if
the alternative remedy is truly adequate, the plaintiff would have no need to seek
additional remedies. Whether the individual obtains an award through an ad-
ministrative action or from a constitutional Bivens action should not matter, as
long as the recovery from each type of action is comparable.
In Carlson v. Green 117 plaintiff had potential actions for wrongful death
114. See supra text accompanying notes 9-10.
115. See supra note 12.
116. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980). Although this principle was announced in
Bivens, Davis v. Passman, and Carlson v. Green, it did not, according to the Supreme Court, become
a holding-as opposed to mere dictum-until the decisions of Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
(1983), and Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). See United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3062-
63 (1987).
117. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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under the FTCA118 and under the eighth amendment for cruel and unusual
punishment. Both causes of action were based on the alleged extreme neglect of
the medical needs of plaintiff's son while in federal prison. The Supreme Court,
examining the FTCA, found no evidence that Congress had intended the statute
to be an exclusive remedy for such actions. The Court, therefore, ruled that the
plaintiff could maintain her common-law and constitutional actions simultane-
ously if she so chose.' 19
In Brown v. General Services Administration 120 plaintiff was a federal em-
ployee who brought suit directly under the Constitution for alleged denial of
promotions based on his race. The Supreme Court reviewed section 717 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,121 a statutory scheme which presumably provided
damages for such unconstitutional activity. In this case the Court found that
Congress had intended that the statute serve as the exclusive, preemptive admin-
istrative remedy for the redress of federal employment discrimination. There-
fore, a federal employee suing for discrimination on the job has no Bivens cause
of action and instead is limited to administrative remedies. 122
In theory, the application of the "alternative remedy" restriction should not
deprive Bivens plaintiffs of a remedy they would otherwise have available
through an action based directly on the Constitution. This restriction does not
apply, after all, unless Congress has provided for an alternative and comparable
remedy. In practice, however, the administrative remedy provided by Congress
in a given case may have a very different result than an alternative constitutional
tort action. For instance, in an administrative action the plaintiff loses her right
to a jury trial. A hearing before an administrative judge may have a result very
different from a full trial before a jury, particularly when the central issue is
overreaching or abuse by the government. Additionally, punitive damages are
generally not available in an administrative action as they are in a Bivens
action. 123
Consequently, under the "alternative remedy" restriction the Bivens plain-
tiff loses at least some of the rights which are available to him in a suit directly
under the Constitution. The loss of these rights is of special concern when one
considers that the Supreme Court has failed to explain adequately how a right
derived directly from the Constitution can be abrogated by an act of
Congress. 124
118. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
119. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 20.
120. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 717 (1964). Section 717 was added to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by § I 1 of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.
122. Id; see Purtill v. Harris, 658 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 111 (1983);
White v. General Servs. Admin., 652 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1981).
123. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983); Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22.
124. Government defendants have argued from time to time that a Bivens action should not lie
whenever any alternative remedy exists, not only when Congress expressly creates an alternative and
exclusive remedy. See Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Hearth, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Welfare, 617 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). This argument is based in part on
the Bivens case itself where, in creating the cause of action, the Supreme Court took special note of
the fact that for "people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan,
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2. The "Special Factors Counseling Hesitation" Restriction
The second and more confusing method by which courts can restrict Bivens
actions, but not a section 1983 action, is through a determination that certain
factors counsel hesitation in implying a Bivens cause of action. 125 In other
words, courts can deny the right to sue a federal employee for a constitutional
tort when "special factors" are present, regardless of whether there is any alter-
native remedy. 126
The problem is that courts have provided little guidance on what special
factors would counsel hesitation in implying a Bivens action. The Supreme
Court has not until very recently even discussed the criteria for determining
when such factors would be present. As the Court recently stated, "there are
varying levels of generality at which one may apply 'special factors' analysis." 127
What has become clear, however, is that the scope of the special factors defense
is broadening, thereby further restricting the right of the victim of a constitu-
tional deprivation to obtain relief.
In Chappell v. Wallace 12 8 the Court held that "enlisted military personnel
may not maintain a suit to recover damages from a superior officer for alleged
constitutional violations." 129 This holding was subsequently extended beyond
the serviceman-superior relationship to restrict all constitutional tort actions
arising out of activity incident to military service. 130 The Supreme Court found
that the unique need within the military to maintain discipline and order was
sufficient to prohibit Bivens actions. 131 Therefore, a serviceman who is illegally
searched or is used as the subject of an LSD experiment without his knowl-
J., concurring); see also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979) (emphasizing that the plain-
tiff had no alternative remedy since a Congressional employee was not subject to the statutory reme-
dies available to other federal employees). This argument has thus far not been accepted by the
courts. See, eg., Carlson, 446 U.S. at 22 (allowing plaintiff to pursue constitutional claims against
the federal employees and a Federal Tort Claims action against the United States Government based
on the same occurrence). The Court in Carson did, however, recognize that the common-law rem-
edy in that case was not a truly "adequate" one. Id. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring). The Supreme
Court has embraced the alternative common-law remedy argument in a different context. The Court
has determined that a plaintiff may fail to plead a violation of the due process clause when there is an
adequate alternative common-law remedy to the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). This argument has, therefore, restricted Bivens actions brought for
violations of the fifth amendment.
125. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
126. [I]t is irrelevant to a "special factors" analysis whether the laws currently on the books
afford Stanley, or any other particular serviceman, an "adequate" federal remedy for his
injuries. The "special facto[r]" that "counsel[s] hesitation" is not the fact that Congress
has chosen to afford some manner of relief in the particular case, but the fact that congres-
sionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate.
United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3063 (1987); see also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-89
(1983) (although the congressionally created alternative remedy was one of the factors counseling
hesitation, the Court assumed for the sake of its holding that such civil service remedies are not as
effective as a damages remedy and do not fully compensate an individual for the harm).
127. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062.
128. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
129. Id. at 305.
130. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3062.
131. Id. The Court also found important to its "special factors" analysis the Constitution's
grant to Congress of authority over the military. Id.
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edge132 has no right to sue for the violation of his constitutional rights, no mat-
ter how outrageous the conduct or how clearly established the constitutional
right which was violated. 133
In Bush v. Lucas,134 decided the same day as Chappell, plaintiff, an engi-
neer at NASA, brought suit under the first amendment, alleging that he had
been demoted because of his critical statements about the agency. Unlike Chap-
pell, the Court found that the need for discipline in nonmilitary federal employ-
ment was, although important, not by itself enough to prohibit a Bivens action.
The Court, however, held that this factor, along with the expertise of Congress
in matters of federal employment and the comprehensive alternative remedies
Congress had provided for such action, was enough to counsel hesitation in per-
mitting a Bivens action. 135
After Chappell and Bush one would discern that a Bivens action would be
unavailable only where the maintenance of such action would be extremely dis-
ruptive to the operation of government, such as in the military or federal em-
ployment areas, and where Congress had provided both a particular expertise
and a comprehensive scheme of remedies. The special factors defense was, how-
ever, broadened in a recent decision of the Supreme Court.
In Schweiker v. Chilicky 13 6 the plaintiffs were handicapped individuals who
were wrongfully deprived of benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act,
allegedly without due process. 137 Although plaintiffs eventually recovered their
entitled benefits under the statute, they brought a Bivens action seeking conse-
quential damages and damages for emotional distress resulting from being de-
prived of their entitled benefits for so long, in some cases for over a year.
The Court assumed for the purposes of its opinion that plaintiffs' due pro-
cess rights had been denied and acknowledged "that suffering months of delay in
receiving the income on which one has depended for the very necessities of life
cannot be fully remedied by the 'belated restoration of back benefits.' "138 De-
spite recognizing that the "trauma to respondents, and thousands.., like them,
must surely have gone beyond what anyone of normal sensibilities would wish to
see imposed on innocent disabled citizens,"'13 9 the Court refused to recognize a
Bivens cause of action. The Court reasoned that Congress is the body charged
with administering social security programs and it has not seen fit to provide
remedies for a constitutional deprivation.
132. Id at 3061-62.
133. This restriction is based on the Feres doctrine, which generally prohibits a serviceman from
suing for injury connected to his military service. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); see
United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).
134. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
135. Id. at 389. The Court described in great detail the various statutory remedies available to a
civil servant for employment actions. Id. at 380-89. While these alternative remedies were part of
the Court's "special factors" analysis, the Court held that the remedies provided under these stat-
utes, although comprehensive, were not exclusive and therefore the "alternative remedy" prohibition
did not apply. Id.
136. 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988).
137. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982).
138. Schweiker, 108 S. Ct. at 2463.
139. Id.
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The Court's decision in Schweiker stands for the proposition that "Con-
gressional authority over a given subject is itself a 'special factor' that 'counsel[s]
hesitation.' -14 Unlike Chappell and Bush, the Court did not find it necessary
for Congress to have exhibited some expertise in the area of the legislation at
issue or for a Bivens action to be particularly disruptive, as in the areas of federal
and military employment. Schweiker seems to hold that if the matter is in Con-
gress' domain, a Bivens remedy will not be available, regardless of whether the
relief provided by Congress contemplates damages for the violation of constitu-
tional rights. 141
The Supreme Court in Schweiker did not necessarily define the outer limits
of the types of special factors which would prohibit a Bivens action. One can
only speculate as to what factors in the future will be sufficient to prohibit an
aggrieved individual from maintaining a constitutional action to vindicate his
rights. The special factors defense remains, then, as another tool which courts
may use in other factual settings to further restrict the viability of a Bivens
action. 142
E. Avenues of Relief Available to Section 1983 Plaintiffs Which Are Denied to
Bivens Plaintiffs
A Bivens plaintiff is not only burdened with restrictions such as those out-
lined above, which do not apply to an individual suing under section 1983.
There also exist certain avenues or opportunities available to a section 1983
plaintiff which are denied to the Bivens plaintiff.
1. Governmental Liability
A constitutional tort plaintiff bringing a section 1983 action for a constitu-
tional transgression perpetrated by a state employee may not recover damages
from the state itself. The Supreme Court has held that, absent a waiver, each of
the fifty state governments has sovereign immunity from constitutional tortS. 14 3
Unlike the immunity which has been applied to the federal government, immu-
nity for state governments is derived directly from the United States Constitu-
tion under the eleventh amendment. 144
140. Id. at 2472 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Congress need not necessarily address and reject a suggestion of damages for a violation of
constitutional rights for the congressionally designed remedy to preclude a Bivens action. "[Tlhe
concept of'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress' has
proved to include an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not
been inadvertent." Id. at 2461 (emphasis added).
142. For additional discussion of the effect of the "alternative remedy" and "special factors"
prohibitions on a Bivens action, see Smith, Bivens Actions for Federal Employees in the Aftermath of
Bush v. Lucas: Which Remedies for Whom?, 14 BALT. L. REv. 413 (1985); Steinman, Backing Off
Bivens and the Ramifications of this Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83
MICH. L. REv. 269 (1984); Note, Two Approaches to Determine Whether an Implied Cause of Action
Under the Constitution Is Necessary: The Changing Scope of the Bivens Action, 19 GA. L. REV. 683
(1985).
143. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
144. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of The United States shall not be
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Sovereign immunity accorded states under the eleventh amendment is not
impenetrable. It may be waived by the states or by an act of Congress, at least
with regard to matters of federal concern. 145 A waiver of sovereign immunity,
whether by the states or by Congress, must be express. 146 The Supreme Court
has determined that, because the Civil Rights Statutes provide for damages
against "persons," Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity for
constitutional torts committed by states.147 Therefore, state governments are
not subject to damages suits for constitutional torts committed by state
employees.
With the advent of the modern era of the constitutional tort, municipalities
were granted the same sovereign immunity afforded to states. In Monroe v.
Pape 148 the Supreme Court held that municipalities, like states, were not "per-
sons" as that term is used under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 and were therefore
protected from suit.149 In 1978 the Court reexamined the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Act and found that Congress had in fact intended the Act to
apply to local governments. 150 Since city and local governments are "persons"
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they are subject to money judgments for violating the
constitutional rights of individuals.151
A municipality is not liable for all constitutional torts committed by its
employees. It is only liable for constitutional deprivations resulting from some
"policy" or "custom" of the local government. 152 The municipality's policy or
custom must have been involved in the constitutional deprivation or have been
the moving force behind it.153 This involvement would include a city council
taking action to fire a government employee without a proper hearing 154 or can-
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI; see infra text accompanying notes 215-32, (discussing the sovereign immunity of states
under the eleventh amendment).
145. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
146. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 445.
147. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Monell, 436 U.S. at 658. The Court in Quern stated:
[Section] 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to
sweep a.way the immunity of the States; nor does it have a history which focuses directly on
the question of state liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.
Quern, 440 U.S. at 345.
148. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
149. Id. at 191-92.
150. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; accord Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980);
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277-79 (1977). The determination of whether
a local government or municipality has sovereign immunity from a constitutional tort is separate
from the question of whether such entity may assert a defense of qualified immunity from such a
claim. In Owen the Supreme Court, addressing this latter question, ruled that there was no basis for
according qualified immunity to a municipality. Owen, 445 U.S. at 650; see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-
91; infra text accompanying notes 232-37.
151. Owen, 445 U.S. at 635; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
152. Owen, 445 U.S. at 633; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
153. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 817-18 (1985)); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
154. Owen, 445 U.S. at 622.
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ceiling a license for a concert based on the content of the performance.15 5
In order for a municipality to incur liability the "policy" or "custom" does
not have to be a long-practiced one, but can be a one-time decision. Moreover, it
need not be that of the ultimate governing authority of the local government. In
Pembaur v. Cincinnati 156 the Supreme Court found the city liable where the city
prosecutor advised police officers to search the defendant's office in order to find
and compel the appearance of two grand jury witnesses who had failed to an-
swer subpoenas. The Court emphasized that municipal liability will attach for a
policy decision relating to a single incident as long as the person making the
decision had appropriate authority.1 57
Governmental (municipal) liability in a section 1983 action is significant for
a number of reasons. First, it provides a deep pocket. This is important not
only so that there will be funds to pay off a successful plaintiff but because it also
likely creates more successful plaintiffs by alleviating the reluctance of judges
and juries to hold an individual employee liable for carrying out his governmen-
tal duties.158 With a clear constitutional violation, the trier of fact will be more
willing to find liability if a governmental entity is going to pay the judgment.
More importantly, seeking redress from a municipality avoids the largest
stumbling block to a constitutional tort recovery: qualified immunity. The
Supreme Court has held that, unlike the government employee whose actions
are at issue, a municipality may not assert the defense of qualified immunity.15 9
In a section 1983 case, the plaintiff may recover from a local government when
the government officials who performed the unconstitutional acts would be
immune.
This was precisely the case in Pembaur v. Cincinnati.1 60 Defendants' con-
duct in Pembaur was not definitively declared to be unconstitutional until sev-
eral years after the incident but before the Supreme Court decided the case.
Because the law was not clearly established at the time of the incident, the indi-
vidual officers and the city attorney were held to be immune. The city, on the
other hand, was held liable because the actions taken were in fact unconstitu-
tional, even though the Supreme Court did not declare them to be so until sev-
155. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
156. 475 U.S. 469, 473 (1986).
157. Whether the individual making the decision is a "policy-making official" who would subject
the governmental entity to liability by virtue of his actions is an issue of state law. It "is not a
question of federal law and it is not a question of fact in the usual sense." City of St. Louis v.
Praprotnik, 56 U.S.L.W. 4201, 4204-05 (March 1, 1988).
Compare Praprotnik with Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), distinguished in
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 482 n. 11. In Tuttle plaintiff alleged that the police officer's use of excessive
force violated the decedent's due process rights. She further alleged that the city was liable by virtue
of its "policy" of failing to provide adequate training to its officers in the use of force. The Court
held that the action at issue was not taken pursuant to a "policy" of the city. At the same time, the
Court found that "[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose
liability under Monell." Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823-24.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 54-66.
159. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); Owen, 445 U.S. at 633; see infra text accompa-
nying notes 237-38 for a discussion of the rationale for this ruling.
160. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
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eral years later. This result could not occur in a Bivens action; if the federal
officials have qualified immunity there can be no recovery.
2. Attorneys' Fees
In 1975 the Supreme Court decided Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society,161 upholding the "American Rule" that a prevailing party is not,
under ordinary circumstances, entitled to attorneys' fees. 162 The Court rejected
the notion that fees should be provided on a more liberal basis in civil rights
cases in order to promote the ability of citizens to seek redress for the violation
of such rights-the so-called "private attorney general" argument.
163
In response to Alyeska, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, codified as part of the Civil Rights Act at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988.164 The Act allows a court, in its discretion, to grant attorneys' fees to
the prevailing party in an action brought under the Civil Rights Statutes.
165 It
was Congress' intent by enacting the statute to promote the concept of the "pri-
vate attorney general." 166 Although the statute is worded generally, the courts
have consistently provided attorneys' fees to successful section 1983 plaintiffs as
a matter of course, even when the fees far exceed the judgment. 167
Although section 1988 provides for attorneys' fees in civil rights actions, it
applies only in those actions brought directly under the Civil Rights Statutes.
While a Bivens action is essentially equivalent to a section 1983 action, a Bivens
plaintiff, because he does not bring his action under the Civil Rights Statutes,
may not obtain attorneys' fees under section 1988.168
Left with only the common-law American Rule which generally provides
161. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
162. Id. at 247.
163. Id. at 271.
164. See Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 567 (1986).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1981) in part reads:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1986 of this title, Title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the court, in its discretion, may allow a prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id.
166. As the Senate reported on the bill:
All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to
vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain. In many cases
arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or
no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil
rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with
impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindi-
cate these rights in court.
S. RaP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. N-ws
5908, 5910.
167. See, ag., Riverside, 477 U.S. 561 (Court upheld an award of $245,456.25 in attorneys' fees
when judgment in favor of plaintiffs was $33,350).
168. Martin v. Heckler, 773 F.2d 1145, 1147 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Unification Church v.
I.N.S., 762 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Premachandra v. Mitts, 753 F.2d 635, 637 (8th Cir.
1985) (en banc); Lauritzen v. Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1984).
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attorneys' fees only if the other side's position is frivolous or fraudulent, Bivens
plaintiffs have sought attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (the
"Act"). 169 This Act provides for attorneys' fees against the United States in any
civil action (a) against the United States if the Court finds the government's
position not to have been substantially justified, 170 or (b) against the United
States or any officer or agency thereof, to the same extent that any other party
would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which
provides for fees.17 1 Attempts by Bivens plaintiffs to obtain attorneys' fees
under the Act have generally proven unsuccessful. 172
The first problem with application of the Act to Bivens cases is that, unlike
section 1988, which provides for fees from the actual defendant,1 73 the Act pro-
vides for fees only from the United States, which of course is never a party to a
Bivens action.174 This difference, in essence, eliminates the Act's more liberal
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), because it requires that the United States
be a party to the action before it pay attorneys' fees. 175
Subsection (1) of the Act does provide for fees when the defendant is an
official of the United States sued in his official capacity, but only "to the same
extent that any other party would be liable under the common-law or under the
169. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1986).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing
party other than the United States fees and other expenses... incurred by that party in any
civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of
agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of
that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
Id.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) states:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of
attorneys ... to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United
States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity
in any court having jurisdiction of such action. The United States shall be liable for such
fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the com-
mon law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.
Id; see Pierce v. Underwood, 101 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1988) (Supreme Court's most recent explanation of
this provision).
172. See cases cited supra note 168; Hall v. United States, 773 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1985); Grace v.
Burger, 763 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1985). But see Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107 (2d Cir. 1984)
(suggesting that the Act would provide for such fees. The court, however, based this suggestion on
several district court cases from other circuits which were later reversed on the attorneys' fees issue).
173. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (holding that § 1988 did not permit plaintiffs
to recover damages from the state when judgment was against individual state employees in their
individual capacities); cf. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (holding that judicial immunity does
not bar an award of attorneys' fees under § 1988 when the plaintiff is a prevailing party and obtains
injunctive relief).
174. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text. The Act is a partial waiver of the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity and, as such, must be strictly construed in favor of maintaining immu-
nity not specifically and clearly waived. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) is more liberal than § 2412(b). Subsection (d)(1)(A) states that a
court shall award fees unless the court finds that the position of the United States was "substantially
justified." Subsection (b) allows a court to award fees in its discretion and then only in accord with
common law rules as to when fees should be awarded. See supra notes 170-71 for full text of
statutes.
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terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.' 1 76 Since 42
U.S.C. § 1988 specifically provides for an award of fees only in actions brought
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986, there is no statute that provides for an award of
attorneys' fees for a Bivens plaintiff. A Bivens plaintiff can therefore only pursue
fees against the United States to the same extent that she can against any
party-under the American Rule.177 In light of all the defenses available to
Bivens defendants, it would only be in very limited instances, if any, that a Biv-
ens plaintiff could establish that the government's defense was frivolous, as is
required to obtain fees under the American Rule.178
Although the wording of the Act and section 1988 clearly differ, there ap-
pears to be no logical reason to differentiate between them. If attorneys' fees are
necessary to ensure that citizens have available avenues to seek redress for viola-
tion of their constitutional rights, 179 it should not matter whether it was a state
or federal official who violated those rights. Yet, as the law presently stands, a
section 1983 plaintiff is generally entitled to attorneys' fees while a Bivens plain-
tiff is not.
The situation is similar to that faced by the Supreme Court in the original
Bivens action. There Congress had created a remedy for persons whose consti-
tutional rights were transgressed by a state actor but not when a federal em-
ployee was involved. In that case the Supreme Court responded by inferring a
remedy from the Constitution. Here, Congress has created a corollary to its
section 1983 remedy by providing for attorneys' fees in civil rights actions
against state officials so as to allow for and encourage victims to obtain redress
for the deprivation of their constitutional rights. Despite the same type of ineq-
uities which were present in Bivens, the Court has thus far refused to take action
similar to that which it took in Bivens and has refused to infer from the Consti-
tution or common law a right to attorneys' fees for a Bivens plaintiff.
As outlined above, governmental liability and the right to attorneys' fees,
which are not made available to a Bivens plaintiff, combined with the extra re-
strictions applicable only in Bivens actions, make the task of the Bivens plaintiff
that much more difficult than that of an individual suing under section 1983.180
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b).
177. See Unification Church v. I.N.S., 762 F.2d 1077, 1079-81 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lauritzen v.
Lehman, 736 F.2d 550, 557-59 (9th Cir. 1984).
178. Even if the plaintiff could establish that the government's defense was frivolous, the United
States would likely contend that 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) is inapplicable to a Bivens action. Subsection
(b) applies to an action brought against a government official in his official capacity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(b). A Bivens action is brought against a government employee in his individual capacity. As
explained by the Supreme Court in Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985): "Personal-
capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under
color of state law." See, ag., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974). Official-capacity suits,
in contrast, "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which
an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978). As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-
capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.
179. See supra notes 165-66.
180. Professor Davis argues that a Bivens action, at least in the abstract, is superior to a § 1983
action because it is not constrained by the twentieth-century statutory interpretation of a nineteenth-
century statute. "The law needs more Bivens and less 1983." 5 K. DAvis, supra note 11, § 27:26.
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These are not, however, all of the impediments a Bivens plaintiff encounters in
her quest to seek redress for her injuries.
F. Additional Obstacles Applicable to Both Bivens and Section 1983 Actions
In addition to the obstacles outlined above that are unique to a Bivens ac-
tion, there exist additional roadblocks which further discourage constitutional
tort plaintiffs from bringing suit and make chances of recovery more difficult.
These roadblocks apply, for the most part, equally to Bivens actions and cases
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
1. No Respondeat Superior
Unlike most plaintiffs, a constitutional tort plaintiff is limited in who she
can sue. The fundamental concept of respondeat superior does not apply in a
constitutional tort action. The plaintiff can sue only those federal officials per-
sonally involved in the alleged unconstitutional conduct.181 Since a Bivens
plaintiff is generally denied discovery through the initial stages of her case, it is
often difficult to determine who may have had direct involvement in the alleg-
edly illegal conduct. By the time the plaintiff is permitted to begin discovery-
after surviving a motion to dismiss based on immunity and an appeal of the
decision on that motion-and finds that other federal employees were involved,
the statute of limitations may have run on naming them as defendants.
2. Does the Claim Rise to the
Level of a Constitutional Tort?
A plaintiff is free to plead common-law and constitutional tort claims aris-
ing from the same conduct. 182 The mere pleading, however, of a constitutional
cause of action does not by itself create such a claim and thereby subject federal
employees to liability for damages.18 3 Although a plaintiff may have lost her
liberty, property, or even life at the hands of the government, if she was not
deprived of her due process she has no right to seek redress under the Constitu-
tion. The courts will scrutinize Bivens claims to ensure that they actually rise to
the level of a constitutional tort.
The scrutiny of Bivens claims has intensified in recent years, particularly
with regard to alleged violations of the due process clause. In Paul v. Davis 1
84
the Supreme Court first warned against allowing the due process clause of the
Constitution to become a "font of tort law." 185 The Court held that the plain-
At the same time, he points out that in application the courts' misunderstanding of Bivens accounts
for the "failure of the Bivens doctrine to compete more successfully with § 1983." Id.
181. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Tarpley v. Greene, 684 F.2d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976); Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524, 528(2d Cir. 1976).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 117-24.
183. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
184. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
185. Id. at 701. "We have noted the 'constitutional shoals' that confront any attempt to derive
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tiff, who was incorrectly listed on a police flyer as a shoplifter, had a cause of
action for defamation but not for a denial of his liberty or property without due
process.
In Baker v. McCollan 186 plaintiff was arrested and held in jail for several
days before the police realized that it was a case of mistaken identity. Admitting
that plaintiff's liberty had wrongfully been deprived, the Court held that his
only cause of action was under common law for false arrest and false
imprisonment. 1 87
It is no doubt difficult to determine where to draw the line in implying a
constitutional cause of action. As Professor Davis points out, the question is
often unanswerable.1 88 The mere fact that one's property, liberty, or even life
has been deprived by the government does not necessarily implicate constitu-
tional protections provided under the fifth amendment. On the other hand, the
recent trend has certainly been to constrict rather than expand the right.189
3. Standard of Culpability
The question has often arisen whether a constitutional tort plaintiff must
establish that the government employee acted with specific intent to deprive her
of her constitutional rights. While the courts were originally split on this issue,
the majority held that the negligent deprivation of a constitutional right was
sufficient to state a cause of action.190 Some courts went further, holding that
the plaintiff needed only prove that her constitutional rights were violated, re-
gardless of whether it occurred through some negligent act.191
When the Supreme Court addressed this issue in a section 1983 case, it
found nothing in the legislative history of the statute requiring any showing
other than that a constitutional right had been violated-strict liability. 192 The
Court therefore held that a negligent deprivation of property amounted to a
deprivation under the due process clause. 193 This conclusion seemed to be
buoyed during the Court's next term when it altered the qualified immunity test
from congressional civil rights statutes a body of general federal tort law...; a fortiori, the proce-
dural guarantees of the Due Process Clause cannot be the source for such law." Id.
186. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
187. Id. at 146. The courts similarly have held that there is no constitutional right to be free
from wrongful indictments or from preindictment investigations conducted in a negligent manner or
from malicious and unfounded claims leveled by the government. See Martinez v. Winner, 548 F.
Supp. 278, 336 (D. Colo. 1982); Gray v. Bell, 542 F. Supp. 927, 930-31 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 712
F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Gill v. Gill, 412 F. Supp. 1153, 1157
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
188. Hearings - S. 829, supra note 40, at 135-36 (statement of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis:
"The problem of what torts are constitutional and what torts are nonconstitutional is likely to pro-
duce a legal quagmire.").
189. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
347-48 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
536 (1984).
190. See Gildin, The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions: The Prima
Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, 11 Ho~srRA L. REV. 557, 567 & n.66 (1983).
191. Id. at 569-70 n.68.
192. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1981).
193. Id. at 536-37.
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to one of objective reasonableness. 194
In two companion cases decided five years later, the Court reversed its view
that negligence was enough to state a cause of action for a deprivation of due
process. 195 While affirming its view that the Civil Rights Statutes as a whole
contain no state of mind requirement, the Court held that a negligent depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property does not state a cause of action under the due
process clause. 196 Thus, as with the issue of whether a claim is of constitutional
magnitude, the recent trend has been to create a culpability standard which
makes it more difficult for the constitutional tort plaintiff to prevail.
197
4. Damages
If a Bivens plaintiff overcomes all of the obstacles to obtaining a judgment,
if she has enough facts to plead his cause of action adequately despite having no
opportunity to engage in discovery, if the individual defendants are not entitled
to immunity, if her allegations are deemed to be of constitutional stature, if there
is no alternative remedy or factor counseling hesitation in implying a Bivens
remedy, and if she is able to prove a constitutional deprivation, she faces the
often difficult task of proving his damages. 198
In Carey v. Piphus' 99 the Supreme Court dismissed the notion that the
mere violation of a constitutional right should automatically result in damages.
The Court rejected the doctrine of presumed damages and ruled that damages
are to be awarded to a constitutional tort litigant according to our common-law
principles of compensating plaintiffs for actual injuries incurred.2° ° In adopting
the rule that only true "compensatory" damages should be awarded, the Court
noted the difficulty in applying common-law principles of compensatory dam-
ages to the constitutional spectrum.
20 1
194. Harlow v. Fitgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18. For a discussion of how the "clearly estab-
lished" qualified immunity test creates a negligence standard of culpability, see Gildin, supra note
190, at 598-604.
195. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
196. "We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an
official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
197. See Mead, Evolution of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can
Constitutional Tort Be Saved From Extinction?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (arguing that
while § 1983 itself has no culpability requirement, the recent trend has been for the Supreme Court
to find some degree of scienter is necessary before the Constitution can be violated).
198. Of the 16 Bivens judgments rendered as of April 1983, seven involved damages of $1,000 or
less. The damages ranged from $1, Clymer, Jr. v. Grzeegorek, Civil Action No. 80-1009-12 (E.D.
Va. 1982), to $2.5 million, Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 438 U.S.
916 (1978) (involving multiple defendants and 1,200 plaintiffs). See Hearings - H.R. 595, supra
note 44, at 16-17, (statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice).
199. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
200. "'The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the
injury caused to plalntiff by defendant's breach of duty.'" Id. at 254-55 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, LAW OF ToRTS § 25.1, at 1299 (1956)); see Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura,
477 U.S. 299 (1986).
201. Carey, 435 U.S. at 258:
In those cases [which do not have a directly analogous common law claim], the task will be
the more difficult one of adapting common-law rules of damages to provide fair compensa-
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In order to prove injuries at common-law, Bivens plaintiffs often must es-
tablish what may be termed "psychological injury" or injury to "dignitary inter-
ests." These include impairment of reputation, humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental and emotional distress. Although such injuries are not the typical
common-law variety, they are compensable in a constitutional tort action.
20 2
Additionally, punitive damages may be obtained in such cases to the same extent
they are available under common law: when the defendant's conduct is wanton,
malicious, or reflects a reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights.
20 3
The problem arises when the plaintiff can establish a deprivation of her constitu-
tional rights but cannot prove a resulting physical or emotional injury other than
an affront to having one's supreme rights violated.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Carey,2°4 a number of courts found
that "compensatory" damages included damages based on the importance of the
constitutional right or principle violated.205 The Supreme Court rejected this
line of reasoning in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura.20 6 Ac-
knowledging that the "elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages"
might vary depending upon the particular constitutional rights deprived, the
Court held that "damages based on the abstract 'value' or 'importance' of consti-
tutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in such
cases." 207
The Stachura decision leaves the state of damages for the constitutional tort
plaintiff uncertain and imbalanced. The victim of an unconstitutional arrest or
search will likely be able to prove psychological injury similar to that suffered
under the common-law torts of false arrest, false imprisonment, or battery. The
law is unclear as to whether she could recover additional damages-whether a
court could hold that she suffered additional injury-because the unconstitu-
tional activity was carried out by a person who used his governmental authority
to perpetrate the violation, such as a police officer or other governmental official.
For the victim of a deprivation of free speech, who does not lose her job or
tion for injuries caused by the deprivation of a constitutional right. Although this task of
adaptation will be one of some delicacy-as this case demonstrates-it must be
undertaken.
202. See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306-07; Carey, 435 U.S. at 264; Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205,
1209 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The court in Baskin observed:
Emotions are intangible but they are none the less perceptible. The hurt done to feelings
and to reputation by an invasion of constitutional rights is no less real and no less compen-
sable than the cost of repairing a broken window pane or a damaged lock. Wounded
psyche and soul are to be salved by damages as much as the property that can be replaced
at the local hardware store.
Id.
203. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983). Punitive damages are not available from a munici-
pality in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259-
66 (1981).
204. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
205. See, eg., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1408 (10th Cir. 1985);
Corriz v. Naranjo, 667 F.2d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1123 (1982); Herrera
v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1227-29 (8th Cir. 1981); Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980).
206. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
207. Id. at 309 (quoting Carey, 435 U.S. at 264-65).
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position as a result of his speech, establishing any type of physical or emotional
injury resulting from the restriction of her speech would seem difficult. Because
she would not be entitled to compensatory damages for the mere deprivation of
an important or supreme right, damages would appear inappropriate under
Stachura.208 Yet, damages have been awarded in such cases even when it was
recognized that they were extremely difficult to measure.20 9 Moreover, denial of
the right to vote has resulted in substantial damages merely upon proof that the
individual was wrongfully deprived of that right, and nothing more.
210
For the victim of a fifth amendment due process violation, the prospect of
obtaining damages is much less certain. It was a procedural due process claim
arising from the suspension of a high school student which was at issue in Carey
v. Piphus.211 Noting that there was no evidence of actual physical or emotional
injury, the Supreme Court in Carey found that plaintiff was entitled to only
nominal damages.2 12
In brief, damages for the Bivens plaintiff is at best an uncertain proposition.
The more a plaintiff can characterize her damages as "compensatory," the better
chance she has. As the law now stands, an individual whose constitutional
rights have been deprived by actions of an overzealous or malicious government
official may receive substantial damages, nominal damages, or nothing at all.
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In its Bivens decision the Supreme Court declared that the victim of a con-
stitutional deprivation at the hands of a federal official was entitled to a remedy
of damages. 213 In application, the damages remedy that the Court created in
Bivens has proved elusive if not almost wholly unavailable.
Notwithstanding all of the citations to constitutional doctrine and com-
mon-law practices, virtually all of the obstacles placed before a Bivens plaintiff
have essentially one factor at their root. That is, courts and juries will under-
standably "interpret" both the facts and the law (particularly the doctrine of
qualified immunity) to prevent issuing a money judgment against a federal offi-
cial for doing nothing more than carrying out his official duties, albeit incor-
rectly, overzealously and unconstitutionally. It is therefore uncertain whether
Bivens plaintiffs will ever have a meaningful remedy until the United States
waives its sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, to the extent such immu-
nity actually exists. The question is, can this be accomplished?
208. Id. at 310.
209. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 57-63 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cerL denied sub. nom. Breenan v.
Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1982); Dellums v.
Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 194-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
210. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 264, 265
n.22).
211. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
212. Id. at 266.
213. See supra text accompanying note 26.
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A. The Legislative Approach
A statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for constitutional torts was first
suggested in the Bivens decision itself.2 14 Amendments to the FTCA that would
allow individuals to sue the United States for constitutional as well as common-
law torts have been repeatedly and unsuccessfully introduced in Congress over
the past fifteen years, almost since the Bivens decision was handed down. 215
While all sides appear to favor an amendment (the civil liberties groups in order
to provide a meaningful remedy, the government in order to relieve its employ-
ees from the fear of personal lawsuits), the proposed legislation has been im-
peded by disputes over certain provisions, the foremost of which has been
qualified immunity. 216
The bills introduced by the government have, for the most part, provided
that the United States, which would be the only defendant in a constitutional
tort action, bould still raise qualified immunity as a defense. Opponents of this
proposed provision point out that municipalities are not entitled to this defense
in section 1983 actions. 2 17 They further suggest that an FTCA amendment that
maintains the defense of qualified immunity will do little to actually increase the
number of damages judgments in favor of plaintiffs. As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in holding that local governments should not be accorded the right to
raise a qualified immunity defense, "many victims of municipal malfeasance
would be left remediless if the city were also allowed to assert a good-faith
defense. Unless countervailing considerations counsel otherwise, the injustice of
such a result should not be tolerated. ' 218 Thus, while virtually everyone agrees
that a legislative waiver of the government's sovereign immunity to constitu-
tional torts is the proper response, that answer does not appear to be
forthcoming.2 19
B. The Judicial Approach
If remedial legislation seems unlikely, perhaps the answer is for the
Supreme Court to reexamine the application of sovereign immunity in the con-
214. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 421-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
215. Bills in the 100th Congress to amend the FrCA to provide a remedy for constitutional torts
include S. 554, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); S. 612, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 3083, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Other attempts to amend the FTCA to include constitutional torts date back
to 1973. For a list and discussion of these bills, see Madden, Allard & Remes, Bedtime for Bivens:
Substituting the United States as Defendant in Constitutional Tort Suits, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 469,
475 (1983).
216. See Madden, Allard & Remes, supra note 215, at 475.
217. See generally Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (holding that munic-
ipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity).
218. Id. at 651.
219. Other issues in dispute and thus delaying passage of an amendment involve the amount of
exemplary damages. A number of the bills provide for the greater of compensatory damages or some
measure of exemplary damages, for example, $2,000 or $200 per day for each violation. Another
matter of concern involves the degree of intra-agency disciplinary procedures which would be set in
motion by virtue of a claim. Civil liberties groups worry that federal employees freed from the threat
of personal liability for their wrongful acts will violate the constitutional rights of citizens with
impunity absent at least the threat of strong disciplinary action.
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text of governmental violations of constitutional rights. While a number of
lower courts have held that the United States has sovereign immunity from con-
stitutional torts,2 20 the Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue.221
It has instead apparently extrapolated the doctrine, as it applied to common-law
torts, because it has a long history in our common law. With a refocused ap-
proach relating solely to the constitutional tort, the Court should now examine
this issue as one of first impression.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is court-created and court-defined.
The Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine has neither a constitutional nor
statutory basis.222 In the absence of direction from either the Constitution or
Congress, the Court generally, and specifically in the case of immunity, looks for
guidance to the common-law and public policy.22 3 The application of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity to constitutional torts does not appear to be sup-
ported by either of these sources.
1. The Historical Basis for Governmental Immunity
From Constitutional Torts
When the Supreme Court first examined the possible application of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in this country, it held that states were not immune
from suits brought by its citizens. 224 In the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia225
the Supreme Court ruled that nothing in the Constitution provides for sovereign
or governmental immunity which would prohibit a federal court from entertain-
ing a damages suit against a state. In what is recognized as the first instance of
overruling a Supreme Court decision by a constitutional amendment,226 the
eleventh amendment was enacted specifically to grant states protection from
suit.22 7
Although the terms of the eleventh amendment only denied federal courts
jurisdiction to hear damages suits against states, it has been interpreted as the
220. See cases cited supra note 55.
221. In Bivens the only mention of sovereign immunity was an assumption by Justice Harlan in
his concurrence that the United States could not be held liable. Justice Harlan wrote that
"[h]owever desirable a direct remedy against the Government might be as a substitute for individual
official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to suit." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The issue of sovereign immunity, as it related to constitutional deprivations rather than
common-law claims, was never addressed.
222. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 428 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the sovereign-
immunity doctrine has no constitutional source"). The law of official immunity of government offi-
cials is similarly derived neither from the Constitution nor from statutory law. "It has been observed
more than once that the law of privilege as a defense to damages actions against officers of Govern-
ment has 'in large part been of judicial making.'" Butz, 438 U.S. at 501-02 (quoting Barr v. Matteo,
360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959)).
223. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 747-48 (1982); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 637 (1980).
224. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 423-25 (1793).
225. Id.
226. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.35 (1978).
227. Courts have interpreted the eleventh amendment to prohibit a citizen from filing suit in
federal court against his own state, although the amendment does not expressly refer to such actions.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
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"constitutionalization" of sovereign immunity for state governments. 228 As the
Supreme Court stated in Edelman v. Jordan,229 "a suit by private parties seeking
to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the eleventh amendment. '230 Of course, neither the eleventh amend-
ment nor any other provision of the Constitution affords sovereign immunity to
the federal government. Therefore, under the Supreme Court's early rulings, the
federal government, with no constitutional provision to protect it, would not be
entitled to sovereign immunity for constitutional or common-law torts.
The Supreme Court eventually changed its position with regard to com-
mon-law tort claims and held that the federal government was entitled to immu-
nity from such actions. The Court found support for this holding in English
common law. It determined that the doctrine of sovereign immunity-"the king
can do no wrong"-was so steeped in English common law that it should be
applied in this country.231
The mere fact that a doctrine was applied in England should not be enough
to support its use in our system. As Justice Holmes noted, "[i]t is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time
of Henry IV."'232 More importantly, the sovereign immunity developed in Eng-
land applied only to common-law wrongs. English judges could not possibly
have applied this concept to a constitutional wrong because England had neither
a constitutional tort cause of action nor a constitution.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity to common-law torts has been sharply
criticized in recent years. The doctrine has been "[d]ecried as irrational and
immoral by some ('an anachronism without rational basis that has existed only
by virtue of inertia'), criticized on historical grounds by others, [and] recognized
by all to have little doctrinal coherence. '233 As Justice Brennan has stated:
In an era when sovereign immunity has been generally recognized by
courts and legislatures as an anachronistic and unnecessary remnant of
a feudal legal system, the Court has aggressively expanded its scope. If
this doctrine were required to enhance liberty of our people in accord-
ance with the Constitution's protections, I could accept it. If the doc-
trine were required by the structure of the federal system created by
the Framers, I could accept it.234
228. See, eg., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 329 (1934). In both Parden and Monaco the Supreme Court acknowledged that under the
eleventh amendment a state can waive its sovereign immunity and consent to be sued in federal
court. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192; Monaco, 292 U.S. at 329; see J. CooK & J. SOBIESKI, I CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTIONS § 2.01, at 2-5 (1987).
229. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
230. Id. at 663.
231. Id. For a discussion of the history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity as it developed in
England, see Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1 (1972); see also W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *239, *241-42 (classical history of the
King's perogative).
232. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
233. Interfirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. United States, 769 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986) (quoting Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d
457, 469, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1961)) (citations omitted).
234. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 302 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A debate over the merits of continuing sovereign immunity is beyond the scope
of this Article. What is important to note, however, is that this much criticized
doctrine is seemingly based on little more than the homage paid to long-standing
common law. It has no constitutional basis and appears to have little or no his-
torical basis in either English or our own common law, at least with regard to a
citizen seeking redress for violations of his constitutional rights.
2. Public Policy Issues Concerning Sovereign Immunity
for Constitutional Torts
The rights granted under the Constitution are of course the supreme rights
of any citizen. In its first decision permitting individuals to sue for damages for
a constitutional deprivation, the Supreme Court explained that a "deprivation
of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a
violation of a state right."'23 5 The Court later explained that a "damages remedy
against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating
cherished constitutional guarantees."' 236 The doctrine of sovereign immunity in
effect eviscerates that 'emedy.
In finding that municipalities have neither sovereign nor qualified immunity
from constitutional torts, the Supreme Court found that "it is fairer to allocate
any resulting financial loss to the inevitable costs of government borne by all the
taxpayers, than to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose rights, albeit
newly recognized, have been violated." 237 The Court described the public pol-
icy grounds supporting a denial of any type of immunity for the government
entity:
How "uniquely amiss" it would be, therefore, if the government it-
self-"the social organ to which all in our society look for the promo-
tion of liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of
worthy norms and goals for social conduct"-were permitted to disa-
vow liability for the injury it has begotten. A damages remedy against
the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating
cherished constitutional guarantees, and the importance of assuring its
efficacy is only accentuated when the wrongdoer is the institution that
has been established to protect the very rights it has transgressed. 23 8
There seems to be no public policy basis for allocating to municipalities and
local governments the "inevitable costs of government" but finding the federal
Other Justices have expressed similar views. See, eg., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89, 164 n.48 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The concept that the sovereign can do
no wrong and that citizens should be remediless in the faces of its abuses is more a relic of medieval
thought than anything else."); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 652 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) (doctrine "more and more out of date"); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 703, (1949) (there "may be substance" in the viewpoint that sovereign immunity is an
"archaic hangover not consonant with modem morality"); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (the doctrine of sovereign immunity "runs
counter to modem democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State").
235. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
236. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1980).
237. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980).
238. Id. at 651.
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government free to walk away from its responsibilities. Yet, with the application
of sovereign immunity, the individual whose rights are violated by the federal
"institution that has been established to protect the very rights it has trans-
gressed,"' 239 is in fact left remediless.
In light of the fact that there exists neither a common-law mandate nor an
historical basis supporting sovereign immunity to constitutional torts, and be-
cause the Supreme Court's own view of public policy would argue for demand-
ing that the federal government answer in damages for its constitutional
transgressions, the Court should specifically address whether the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity has any application to a Bivens action.
C. An Alternative Approach: Narrow the Qualified Immunity Defense
If the courts are reluctant to sound the death knell of sovereign immunity
in the context of constitutional deprivations, they should at least apply qualified
immunity for the purpose for which it was created. The Supreme Court has
stated on numerous occasions that a federal official is entitled to qualified immu-
nity if his acts were within the outer perimeter of his employment and were
discretionary. 24° As applied, the requisite level of discretion has been so low
that virtually every government employee who does more than sit at a desk and
stamp documents is considered to be acting in a discretionary fashion. 241
Government actors should be protected from the ramifications of their dis-
cretionary decisions. A cabinet official should be free to determine that ten per-
cent of his work force must be dismissed in order to meet budget constraints. A
high level official should be allowed to set the parameters for entitlement pro-
grams even if that decision deprives those entitlements to some people who
would otherwise receive them. These are the types of "governmental" decisions
that should be protected from reprisal. On the other hand, a decision whether to
get a warrant, how to conduct a search, whether to permit a group to protest, or
what type of hearing to provide, are the types of decisions made by government
officials every day. They are the routine acts of government which should not be
subject to immunity if a government official improperly performs those acts and
deprives a citizen of her constitutional rights in the process.
The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to redefine the "discre-
tion" requirement in the context of an absolute immunity case.242 In Westfall v.
Erwin243 the Court reaffirmed that only discretionary acts would be subject to
immunity. At the same time, the Court provided little guidance for determining
what acts are discretionary. The Court relied on a previously described balanc-
ing test 244 which holds immunity to be appropriate when "'the contributions of
239. Id.
240. See, eg., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800
(1982).
241. See cases cited supra note 91.
242. Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580, 584-85 (1988); see supra note 91.
243. Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 584-85.
244. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973).
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immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the perhaps
recurring harm to individual citizens.' "245
Although the Court settled on a rather wide-ranging standard, it cautioned
that the test should not be applied too broadly. The Court explained that it had
always recognized that "official immunity comes at a great cost: An injured
party with an otherwise meritorious tort claim is denied compensation simply
because he had the misfortune to be injured by a federal official."'246 For this
reason the Court rejected the government's argument that immunity should be
accorded to any official who exercises a minimum of discretion. 247 The Court
found that "[b]ecause virtually all official acts involve some modicum of
choice, petitioners' reading of the requirement would render it essentially
meaningless. '248
Although the Court used Westfall to reaffirm the importance of the "discre-
tion" requirement, which had essentially been ignored in the immunity analysis
conducted by the lower courts, its nebulous standard does little to guide courts
in the application of that requirement. Indeed, the Court recognized this defi-
ciency when it concluded that "Congress is in the best position to provide gui-
dance for the complex and often highly empirical inquiry into whether absolute
[or qualified] immunity is warranted in a particular context." 249 As outlined
above, waiting for a legislative solution does not seem to be the answer and will
certainly not help the victims of governmental violations of constitutional rights
which will occur in the interim.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has always addressed constitutional torts cases with an
eye toward the "balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication
of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' effective performance of
their duties."'250 Now is the appropriate time to restore the system to a proper
balance. If, as the Court stated, a "damages remedy against an offending party
is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional
rights, '251 the Supreme Court must awaken to the fact that its recent decisions
have essentially eliminated that remedy. The Court must act to give the Bivens
plaintiff, whose "cherished constitutional rights"252 were in fact violated, at least
a fair opportunity to obtain redress for those violations.
245. Westfall, 108 S. Ct. at 583 (quoting Doe, 412 U.S. at 320).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 584.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 585.
250. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
251. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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